

Message Text

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: DISCUSSION WITH
SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN REPS
FEBRUARY 6, 1974

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: SCHEDULED INFORMAL DISCUSSION
WITH SOVIETS REPS KHLESTOV AND SMIRNOVSKY, POLISH
REP STRULAK AND CZECH REP KLEIN TOOK PLACE ON
EVENING OF FEBRUARY 6 WUTH UK REP (ROSE), BELGIAN REP
(ADRIAESSEN) AND US REP AND DEPREP. US REP PRESENTED
TALKING POINTS AGREED BY AD HOC GROUP. KHLESTOV'S
RESPONSE WAS CORDIAL AND OPEN IN TONE BUT NOT FORTH-
COMING AS REGARDS CONTENT OF PROCEDURAL PROPOSAL. HE

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WELCOMED THE POSSIBILITY FOR NFORMAL DISCUSSION AND

EXPLICITLY REQUESTED THAT SUCH DISCUSSION BE CONTINUED.
HE PRESSED FOR MORE CLARIFICATIONS FROM ALLIES ON LINKAGE OF PHASES.
HE THEN STATED THAT IT WAS MISCONCEPTION TO BELIEVE
THAT EAST WOULD ACCEPT TWO-PHASE CONCEPT, BUT PROCEEDED
TO SUGGEST AS A HYPOTHETICAL POSSIBILITY A TWO-PHASE
VERSION OF HIS OWN WITH US, UK, FRG AND USSR REDUCTIONS IN
THE FIRST PHASE. KHLESTOV DID NOT RAISE QUESTION OF INCLUSION
OF AIR FORCE OR NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE SAID THE ALLIED
PROCEDURAL PROPOSAL WAS UNFAIR BECAUSE ITS BASIS WAS
THAT THE EAST SHOULD AGREE TO DISCUSS THE ITEMS
OF THE WESTERN PROGRAM, BEGINNING WITH US-SOVIET FORCES
AND THE COMMON CEILING, WHILE DEPARTING FROM THEIR OWN
EASTERN PROGRAM AND LEAVING IT ASIDE. INSTEAD, PROGRAMS OF
BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THESE INFORMAL SESSIONS.
ONLY IN THAT WAY COULD COMPROMISE BE REACHED. HE
WOULD BE VERY WILLING TO PROCEED IN THIS WAY. AFTER
BRIEF RESPONSE TO SOME OF KHLESTOV'S POINTS, US REP
INVITED GROUP FOR FURTHER SESSION ON WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 13.

END SUMMARY

2. US REP BEGAN DISCUSSION BY PRESENTING AGREED
TALKING POINTS PRECISELY AS THEY HAD BEEN APPROVED
BY AD HOC GROUP. KHLESTOV THANKED US REP AND SAID
HE WOULD LIKE TO UNDERSTAND BETTER THE ALLIED CLARIFICATIONS
HE HAD BEEN GIVEN. ACCORDING TO REMARKS
BY ALLIED REP, THE FIRST PHASE WOULD CONTAIN A PROVISION
FOR LINKAGE. WHAT WOULD BE IN THIS PROVISION? WHAT
WOULD IT CONTAIN? US REP ANSWERED THAT THE PROVISION
WOULD SPECIFY THE COMMITMENT OF THE WESTERN ALLIES
TO HOLD A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. ASSUMING
PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON THE CONTENT OF THE FIRST PHASE,
THE ALLIES WOULD WORK WITH THE EAST TO DEVELOP THE
EXACT LANGUAGE AND THE TOPICS THIS PROVISION WOULD
COVER. THE PROVISION COULD ALSO PROVIDE THAT IN THE
SECOND PHASE, REDUCTIONS WOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE
ALLIED SIDE ON THE FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.
THIS MEANT THAT ON ALLIED SIDE, AT LEAST A MAJORITY
OF THE REDUCTIONS PROJECTED WOULD BE BY OTHER DIRECT
ALLIED PARTICIPANTS. THERE WOULD ALSO BE A PROVISION
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AS REGARDS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES.

3. KHLESTOV SAID US REP WAS APPARENTLY SPEAKING
OF THE TIME RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES. DID
HE MEAN THE TIME WHEN SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED,
OR THE TIME OF REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE? UK
REP REPLIED THE ALLIES WERE SPEAKING OF THE TIME WHEN
THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. KHLESTOV SAID AS HE UNDER-

STOOD IT THEN, WHAT ALLIES WERE REFERRING TO WAS ONLY THE TIME OF THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. US REP SAID THAT THIS WAS ALL THAT COULD BE SAID NOW ON THE SUBJECT. THE LINKAGE PROVISION TO BE DISCUSSED LATER COULD DEAL WITH MATTERS OF THIS TYPE. UK REP SAID THE PROVISION THE ALLIES HAD IN MIND WOULD PROVIDE FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE. AS ALLIES SAW IT NOW, THIS PROVISION WOULD PROVIDE FOR A CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A SECOND PHASE RATHER THAN IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT PHASE. KHLESTOV SAID THAT ACCORDING TO THE ALLIED CLARIFICATIONS, THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WOULD ONLY CONTAIN A PROVISION COMMITTING THE ALLIES TO ENTERING A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND ESTABLISHING THE TIMING OF THAT SECOND PHASE. OR WOULD THE PROVISION ALSO INCLUDE TIMING OF THE REDUCTIONS OF THE SECOND PHASE?

4. UK REP SAID THE PROVISION WOULD APPLY TO THE BEGINNING OF SECOND-PHASE NEGOTIATIONS. SOVIETS SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT THE PRESENT DISCUSSION COVERED ONLY A PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT. SINCE THIS WAS THE CASE, THE QUESTION OF THE TIMING OF THE SECOND PHASE WOULD HAVE TO BE LEFT FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION LATER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. US REP POINTED OUT THAT ALLIES WERE NOT ASKING THE SOVIETS TO DROP ANY ASPECTS OF THEIR SUBSTANTIVE PROGRAM NOR DID THEY INTEND TO DROP ANY OF THEIR OWN. THEY ONLY WANTED TO START TALKING ON A SPECIFIC POINT. SOVIETS WOULD NOT RISK ANYTHING. THEREFORE, THE ALLIES WERE MAKING ONLY LIMITED CLARIFICATIONS AT THIS TIME. UK REP POINTED OUT ALLIES WERE ONLY PROVIDING LIMITED CLARIFICATIONS SINCE THEY WERE ONLY PROPOSING A PRACTICAL MOVE WITHOUT SUBSTANTIVE LOSS TO THE EASTERN SIDE. US REP SAID THAT EXTENT OF FURTHER CLARIFICATION WOULD BE
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IN RELATIONSHIP TO PROGRESS MADE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. KHLESTOV SAID HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WANTED TO ASK FURTHER QUESTIONS IN ORDER TO BETTER UNDERSTAND THE ALLIED SUGGESTION. SUBSEQUENTLY, THEY WOULD EXPRESS THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THIS PROPOSAL.

6. STRULAK ASKED WHETHER THE ALLIED REPS HAD SAID THAT THE SECOND PHASE WOULD DEPEND ON SATISFACTORY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FIRST PHASE. BELGIAN REP SAID THE ALLIES HAD NOT RAISED THE SUBJECT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE I. THE ALLIES WERE NOT TRYING TO EVADE THE PARTICIPATION ISSUE PROPOSED BY THE EAST. THEY WANTED TO DISCUSS THE FIRST PHASE FIRST AND IF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT BEGAN TO TAKE SHAPE, THEY WERE WILLING TO GIVE FURTHER CLARIFICATIONS. THEY HAD NOT RAISED THE

ISSUE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FIRST PHASE. UK REP SAID ALLIES WERE NOT TALKING ABOUT THIS ISSUE NOW. THEY WERE TALKING ABOUT A PROVISION IN THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD CONTAIN A FIRM COMMITMENT THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD CONTINUE IN THE SECOND PHASE. US REP SAID THAT IF PROGRESS WERE MADE IN THE FIRST PHASE, THE ALLIES COULD BECOME MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE SECOND PHASE.

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STRULAK COMMENTED THAT, APPARENTLY, THE ALLIES VIEWED EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING IDEA AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR BOTH FIRST AND SECOND PHASES. BELGIAN REP SAID ALLIES WERE ASKING FOR AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT IN THE FIRST PHASE, WITH US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE CONSIDERED AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT COMMON CEILING, BUT OF COURSE THE VERY IDEA OF THE COMMON CEILING IMPLIED THAT OTHER FORCES WOULD PARTICIPATE.

7. STRULAK ASKED WHETHER, IF THERE WERE DIFFICULTIES IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING, THE ALLIES WOULD MAKE DIFFICULTIES ABOUT PROCEEDING TO THE SECOND PHASE. US REP POINTED OUT THAT IN PRESENTING HIS COMMENTS, WHICH OF COURSE HAD BEEN MADE IN THE NAME OF ALL THE ALLIES, HE HAD MADE A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL. THE EASTERN REPS WERE GOING TOO FAR IN THEIR QUESTIONS, INTO THE SECRET

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REALM OF SUBSTANCE. THE ALLIES AT THIS TIME WERE SEEKING ONLY A PROCEDURAL UNDERSTANDING TO START THE DISCUSSION AT A SPECIFIC POINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE SUBSTANTIVE VIEWS OF EITHER SIDE OR GIVING UP THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO THEM AT ANY POINT. STRULAK'S QUESTIONS WENT TOO FAR AND THEY COULD NOT BE FULLY ANSWERED AT THIS TIME. STRULAK SAID HE WOULD NOT HAVE RAISED THE COMMON CEILING ISSUE UNLESS THE ALLIES HAD MENTIONED IT THEMSELVES. US REP SAID ALLIES HAD RAISED THE COMMON CEILING ISSUE ONLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE POINT ABOUT THE SECOND PHASE FOCUSING ON THE OTHER FORCES. HE HAD POINTED OUT THAT IF AGREEMENT WERE REACHED ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT IN PHASE I, THE SECOND PHASE WOULD ON THE ALLIED SIDE CONCENTRATE ON FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. BELGIAN REP SAID THESE POINTS WERE IMPLICIT IN ALLIED THINKING. THE ALLIES WOULD BECOME MORE PRECISE IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS. UK REP OBSERVED THAT THE COMMON CEILING WAS A FIRM ELEMENT OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS. US REP POINTED OUT THAT THE ALLIED PROPOSAL WAS TO DISCUSS US-SOVIET FORCES FIRST. ALLIES WERE NOT ASKING FOR SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR SUCH DISCUSSION.

8. CZECH REP SAID THAT, WITH REGARD TO INCLUSION OF OTHER NATIONAL FORCES, EASTERN REPS HAD A SECOND CONCERN. A SITUATION COULD EMERGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHERE THE NATIONAL FORCES NOT AFFECTED BY THE FIRST PHASE COULD BUILD UP THEIR OWN ARMED FORCES IN THE PERIOD UNTIL THE SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED. WHAT ABOUT THIS QUESTION? US REP REPLIED THAT ALLIED HAD HEARD EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN ON THIS POINT FROM THE EAST PREVIOUSLY. HE WOULD REPORT TO HIS COLLEAGUES THAT EASTERN REPS HAD RAISED THIS ISSUE AND ASK THEM TO CONSIDER THIS QUESTION.

9. SMIRNOVSKY SAID ALLIED PRESENTATION HAD EMPHASIZED THAT THE PARTICIPANTS SHOULD DISCUSS THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING. WHAT DID THIS CONCEPT MEAN? US REP SAID ALLIES DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN

AGREEING TO THE IDEA OF THE COMMON CEILING AND A

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SEPARATE STEP OF AGREEING ON AN ACTUAL NUMBER AT WHICH THE COMMON CEILING SHOULD BE SET. ALLIES DID NOT INSIST ON AGREEING TO AN ACTUAL NUMBER IN PHASE I. UK REP SAID THE ALLIES HAD GIVEN THE 700,000 MAN FIGURE AS AN ILLUSTRATION AS WELL AS A SUGGESTION.

10. KHESTOV ASKED WHETHER THE ALLIES MEANT AN OVERALL COMMON CEILING AS WELL AS A COMMON CEILING ON US AND SOVIET FORCES. DID THE ALLIES INTEND TO MAKE AN OVERALL GROUP CEILING? TO DISCUSS A COMMON CEILING FOR ALL FORCES? WHEN WOULD THERE BE A COMMON CEILING FOR AMERICAN AND SOVIET FORCES -- IN THE FIRST PHASE OR IN THE SECOND? BELGIAN REP SAID THESE WERE TWO DIFFERENT NOTIONS. THE ALLIES HAD IN MIND A GLOBAL EFFORT FOR THE WHOLE OPERATION, INCLUDING SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES IN THE FIRST PHASE, WITH OTHERS TO FOLLOW IN THE SECOND PHASE. SOVIET-AMERICAN REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE BE THE INITIAL CONTRIBUTION TO REACHING THE COMMON CEILING. WHAT WOULD BE LEFT OVER IN THE SECOND PHASE WOULD BE THE COMPLETION OF THE MOVEMENT TO REACH THE COMMON CEILING. THIS WOULD BE THE RANGE OF THE REDUCTIONS WHICH OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD FULFILL. UK REP SAID THE IMPORTANT THING ABOUT THE SECOND PHASE IS THAT THE COMMON CEILING TO BE REACHED WOULD APPLY TO ALL FORCES IN THE AREA INCLUDING US AND SOVIET. PRECISELY WHAT REDUCTIONS WOULD BE INVOLVED COULD NOT BE DETERMINED NOW AND WOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS IN PHASE II. THE ONLY THING ON THE TOPIC WHICH CAN BE SAID NOW WAS THAT ON THE ALLIED SIDE PHASE II WOULD FOCUS ON OTHER PARTICIPANTS THAN THE U.S. BELGIAN REP SAID THE REDUCTION IN THE FIRST PHASE WOULD BE BY U.S. AND U.S.S.R. WITH OTHERS TO FOLLOW IN PHASE II. SMIRNOVSKY ASKED WHETHER THESE REMARKS MEANT THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD TAKE PART IN THE SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS. UK REP SAID THAT ALL THAT HE COULD SAY NOW WAS THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE COMMON CEILING AT THE END. HOW REDUCTIONS WOULD BE APPORTIONED AMONG THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED LATER.

1. KHESTOV ASKED WHETHER, IN THE LINKAGE PROVISION

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ENVISIONED BY THE ALLIES WHICH WOULD CONTAIN A COMMIT-
MENT TO NEGOTIATE THE SECOND PHASE, THE ALLIES MEANT
TO SAY THERE WOULD BE A PROVISION ON THE TIMING
OF WHEN THE SECOND PHASE WOULD TAKE PLACE -- A
SPECIFIC MONTH OR YEAR -- OR COULD THE ALLIES COMMENT
ON THIS POINT FURTHER NOW? US REP SAID THE QUESTION
WAS A VALID ONE, BUT ALLIES COULD NOT COMMENT
ON IT FURTHER AT THIS TIME. BELGIAN REP SAID SOVIET
INTEREST IN THIS ISSUE WAS NORMAL. IT WAS NATURAL
THAT THE EAST WOULD WISH TO MAKE SURE THAT THE WEST
DID NOT EVADE A LINK BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES. THE
ALLIES REALIZED THAT WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE A

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COMMITMENT IMPLIED SOME AGREEMENT ON A DATE. AS
FOR THE SPECIFIC CONTENT, THAT WAS A QUESTION FOR
LATER IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER,
GENERAL PRINCIPLE PREVAILED THAT A LAST WILL AND

TESTAMENT WAS NOT VALID WITHOUT A DATE. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE HARD TO IMAGINE A COMPLETED PROVISION PROVIDING FOR A LINK WITHOUT REFERENCE TO A DATE.

12. SMIRNOVSKY ASKED WHETHER ALLIES WERE PREPARED TO INDICATE HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE TO NEGOTIATE THE SECOND PHASE. UK REP SAID THAT, AS A NON-LAWYER, HE WOULD NOT LIKE TO WRITE A WILL WHICH FORECAST THE DATE ON WHICH IT WOULD COME INTO EFFECT. BELGIAN REP SAID THIS ISSUE WAS SUBJECT TO SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION AND NEGOTIATION.

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13. KHLESTOV ASKED WHETHER VIEWS OF ALLIED REPS AND ALLIED PROPOSAL PRESENTED WERE THE OFFICIAL IDEAS OF THEIR COLLEAGUES OR INFORMAL PERSONAL SUGGESTIONS. ALLIED REPS SAID THAT THEY WERE SPEAKING FOR THEIR ALLIES.

14. POLISH REP NOTED THAT ALLIES HAD SAID WITH REGARD TO THE COMMON CEILING THAT THE 700,000 MAN FIGURE WAS AN ILLUSTRATION AND A SUGGESTION. BUT IF ANOTHER NUMBER WERE AGREED, WOULD IT HAVE TO BE AN EQUAL NUMBER ON BOTH SIDES? ALLIED REPS REPLIED "YES". POLISH REP OBSERVED THAT HIS UNDERSTANDING OF PARITY WAS A DIFFERENT ONE FROM THAT OF THE ALLIES REPS.

15. AT THIS POINT KHLESTOV REQUESTED OPPORTUNITY TO WITHDRAW TO CONFER WITH HIS EASTERN COLLEAGES. AFTER A TEN-MINUTE BREAK, THEY RETURNED, AND KHLESTOV MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

16. KHLESTOV SAID HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WERE FULLY IN FAVOR OF INFORMAL WORKING MEETINGS OF THIS KIND. ALL OF HIS COLLEAGUES FROM THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES STRONGLY FAVORED SUPPLEMENTING PLENARIES BY SUCH WORKING ARRANGEMENTS. FROM THIS VIEWPOINT, EASTERN REPS WERE READY AND WILLING TO CONTINUE WORKING MEETINGS OF THE PRESENT TYPE. AS REGARDS THE ALLIED PRESENTATION AND CLARIFICATIONS, HE WISHED TO POINT OUT THAT CERTAIN FORMULATIONS USED BY US REP IN EXPLAINING THE PRESENT SITUATION WERE NOT IN TUNE WITH EASTERN THINKING. HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE THE EASTERN POSITION CLEAR IN ORDER TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS. HE HAD NOT TAKEN NOTES ON THE REMARKS OF THE US REP, BUT HE DID REMEMBER CERTAIN FORMULATIONS. HE BELIEVED ALLIED REPS HAD MADE REFERENCE TO "EAST-WEST" WORKING MEETINGS. FOR THEIR PART, EASTERN REPS BELIEVED GATHERINGS OF THIS SORT SHOULD MERELY BE CALLED WORKING MEETINGS OF DELEGATIONS. EASTERN REPS

FAVORED MEETINGS OF THIS KIND, BUT NOT THE DESIGNATION "EAST-WEST".

17. KLESTOV CONTINUED THAT, IN THE PRESENTATION OF US REP, CERTAIN ELEMENTS HAD BEEN CONTAINED WHICH DID NOT QUITE COINCIDE WITH THE EASTERN UNDERSTANDING OF THE CURRENT STATE

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OF AFFAIRS. THE IDEA HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE US REPS PRESENTATION THAT THE EAST HAD EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE PRECISE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION. THE US REP HAD INDICATED THAT THERE HAD BEEN REQUESTS FROM THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO PROVIDE BETTER LINKAGE BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND PHASE. THIS VIEW DID NOT REFLECT THE PRACTICAL SITUATION. DURING THE PREVIOUS SESSION, EASTERN REP CRITICIZED THE WESTERN APPROACH IN PARTICULAR BECAUSE IN THE WESTERN PROGRAM NOTHING WAS SAID ABOUT THE LINK BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND PHASE. BUT THESE POINTS HAD BEEN MADE BY EASTERN REPS AS FURTHER PROOF OF THE DEFECTIVENESS OF THE WESTERN APPROACH. THESE POINTS DID NOT MEAN THAT THE EAST AGREED TO THE TWO-PHASE APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS OR REDUCTIONS. THE EASTERN APPROACH WAS QUITE DIFFERENT. THE EAST WAS OPPOSED TO DIVIDING NEGOTIATIONS INTO TWO PHASES. HE WANTED TO MAKE EASTERN VIEWS COMPLETELY CLEAR SINCE ALLIED REPS WERE SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THEIR OTHER ALLIES TOO. HE WISHED TO STRESS THAT EASTERN INSISTENCE ON THE ABSENCE OF LINKS BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES OF THE ALLIED PROPOSAL DID NOT MEAN THAT THE EAST AGREED TO THE TWO-PHASE CONCEPT.

18. KHESTOV SAID THE ALLIED PROCEDURAL PROPOSAL BOILED DOWN TO THE FOLLOWING IDEA, TO BEGIN TO DISCUSS ONLY THE QUESTIONS OF REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET AND US FORCES AND THE COMMON CEILING, AND TO DEFER IN THE MEANWHILE THE DISCUSSION OF THE WHOLE RANGE OF QUESTIONS FACED BY THE NEGOTIATIONS, OF ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM. REGARDING THESE OTHER QUESTIONS, ALLIES HAD ONLY POINTED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING PROVISION IN THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE. THE EASTERN POSITION ON THE OTHER HAND STIPULATED DISCUSSION FROM THE OUTSET OF REDUCTION OF THE FORCES OF ALL ELEVEN OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE CURRENT WESTERN PROPOSAL AMOUNTED IN PRACTICE TO BEGINNING DISCUSSION ON SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES AND THE

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COMMON CEILING. IF THE EAST WERE TO AGREE TO THIS, WHAT WOULD IT MEAN FOR THE EASTERN POSITION? IT WOULD MEAN THAT DURING WORKING MEETINGS LIKE THIS ONE, THE EAST WOULD BE IN A POSITION WHERE IT COULD NOT INSIST ON IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF ITS OWN POSITION. FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME WHICH ALLIED REPS HAD NOT SPECIFIED, THE EAST WOULD BE FORCED TO FOREGO DISCUSSION OF THE REDUCTION OF OTHER FORCES. THIS WAS UNFAIR. ALLIED REPS WERE AWARE THAT AT ALL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES ALL PARTICIPANTS WRANGLERED TO HAVE THEIR OWN PROPOSAL CHOSEN AS THE BASIS OF DISCUSSION. BECAUSE NO ONE PROPOSAL CAN BE FAVORED, USUALLY IT IS AGREED

TO TAKE ALL THE PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE AS A BASIS OF DISCUSSION. IF THE PROPOSAL OF ONE PARTY IS NOT INCLUDED AS THE BASIS OF DISCUSSION, THIS OUTCOME IS TO THE DETRIMENT OF THAT PARTICIPANT. THE ALLIED PROPOSAL FOR AN INFORMAL PROCEDURAL UNDERSTANDING AMOUNTED TO A DESIRE TO DISCUSS THE ALLIED PROPOSAL AND NOT THE SECRET

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EASTERN ONE. THIS WAS NOT THE PRACTICAL WAY TO SEEK AND REACH COMPROMISE. THE PROBLEM FACED BY THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS WAS A COMPLEX ONE. THE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE CERTAIN POSSIBILITIES OF COMPROMISE OR ACCOMMODATION.

IF THE ENTIRE RANGE OF PROBLEMS WERE DISCUSSED, IT WOULD BE EASIER TO LOOK FOR A COMPROMISE.

19. IN THIS SENSE, KHLESTOV CONTINUED, THOSE PRESENT MIGHT ASSUME HYPOTHETICALLY FOR THE MOMENT THAT, IN THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION, A WAY MIGHT BE FOUND TO REDUCE NOT ALL PARTICIPANTS FROM THE OUTSET BUT PERHAPS FIVE OR SEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THIS WOULD BE AN ACCOMMODATION. HE DID NOT WISH TO DEPART FROM THE EASTERN POSITION, BUT ONLY TO GIVE A HYPOTHETICAL ILLUSTRATION. FOR EXAMPLE, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO ARRIVE AT A POSSIBLE SOLUTION LIMITING REDUCTIONS TO SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES. IT WOULD BE EASIER TO ARRIVE AT A COMPROMISE WHEREBY US AND SOVIET FORCES AND UK AND FRG FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED FIRST. IF SUCH A GROUPING WERE POSSIBLE, IT WOULD BE EASIER TO FIND A MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. BUT IF THE CURRENT ALLI

PROPOSAL WERE TO BE ACCEPTED, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO LOOK FOR A SOLUTION ON A WIDER BASIS COVERING OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. SO IN TERMS OF LOOKING FOR A COMPROMISE THE ALLIED PROPOSAL WAS NOT THE BEST ONE. TO SUM UP, IN HIS VIEW, THE ALLIED PROCEDURAL PROPOSAL WAS UNFAIR AND WAS IMPRACTICAL IN TERMS OF LOOKING FOR A SOLUTION.

20. IF IT WANTED TO, THE EAST COULD MAKE A PARALLEL PROPOSAL OF ITS OWN ALONG SIMILAR LINES. THE EAST DID NOT AGREE TO THE COMMON CEILING, SO THAT IT WOULD SUGGEST IT BE LEFT ASIDE AND THAT DISCUSSION FOCUS ONLY ON THE EASTERN PROPOSAL BUT NOT THE WESTERN ONE. WOULD ALLIED REPS AGREE IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES? THEY WOULD NOT. BUT IF THE SEARCH WAS TO BE FOR A MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE PROCEDURAL PROPOSAL, A DIFFERENT WAY SHOULD BE FOLLOWED. A PRACTICAL AND FAIR WAY OF BEGINNING THE WORK OF SUCH WORKING GROUPS OF THE PRESENT TYPE WOULD BE TO DISCUSS ALL THE POINTS RAISED BY BOTH SIDES.

21. HE WISHED TO MAKE ANOTHER POINT. ALLIED REPS HAD SAID THAT, DURING DISCUSSION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES, THE QUESTION OF LINKAGE MIGHT FURTHER BE DISCUSSED. THIS MEANT THAT
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FORMULATIONS OF LINKAGE PROVISIONS COULD BE DEALT WITH DURING DISCUSSION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES. BUT, IN FACT, THIS PROVISION CONCERNED THE WHOLE OF THE EASTERN CONCERNS REGARDING OTHER FOREIGN TROOPS AND NATIONAL FORCES. SO, IF THE ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES' PROPOSAL ALLOWED FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF DISCUSSING LINKAGE DURING THE PRESENT MEETINGS, THEY WERE IN PRACTICE ALLOWING FOR THE DISCUSSION OF THE WHOLE RANGE OF PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD NOT APPEAR TO HIM LOGICAL TO SAY THAT THE SUBJECT OF US AND SOVIET FORCES COULD BE DISCUSSED AND ONLY THEN THE POSSIBILITY OF LINKAGE. THE ALLIES MIGHT IN ANY GIVEN TIME SIMPLY SAY THAT THEY ARE UNWILLING

TO DISCUSS LINKAGE OR DISCUSS IT IMPROPERLY. CONSEQUENTLY, THE EASTERN REPS PREFER THAT IN THESE INFORMAL GATHERINGS ALL PROPOSALS WHICH HAVE BEEN PRESENTED THUS FAR SHOULD BE DISCUSSED. ON THIS BASIS A SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS COULD BE CONTINUED.

THIS WAS THE EASTERN PROPOSAL.

22. US REP SAID HE WAS GLAD THAT SOVIETS AND EASTERN REPS AGREED THAT DISCUSSION OF THE PRESENT TYPE WAS USEFUL SINCE IT INDICATED BOTH SIDES WERE INTERESTED IN SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS. SECOND, THE SOVIET REP HAD MADE THE POINT THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO HIM HOW LONG ALLIES WERE ASKING EAST TO REFRAIN FROM DISCUSSING OTHER INTERESTS, WHILE US AND SOVIET FORCES WERE BEING DISCUSSED. ALLIED CONSIDERED THAT THIS QUESTION WAS REALLY UP TO THE EASTERN REPS. EASTERN REPS WERE BEING ASKED TO REFRAIN FROM RAISING OTHER INTERESTS ONLY DURING THE TIME THEY THOUGHT TALKS ON US AND SOVIET FORCES WERE USEFUL.

THEY COULD STOP WHEN THEY THOUGHT THIS DISCUSSION WAS NO LONGER USEFUL. THE SOVIET REP HAD RAISED QUESTION WHETHER ALLIED REPS WOULD BE FAIR IN DISCUSSING LINKAGE. ALLIED REPS KNEW THIS ISSUE WAS IMPORTANT TO THE EAST AND INTENDED TO BE FAIR ABOUT IT. THEY MERELY ASKED TH

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